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Abstract—Mobile social networks (MSNs) are specific types of
social media which consolidate the ability of omnipresent connec-
tion for mobile users/devices to share user-centric data objects
among interested users. Taking advantage of the characteristics
of both social networks and opportunistic networks (OppNets),
MSNs are capable of providing an efficient and effective mobile en-
vironment for users to access, share, and distribute data. However,
the lack of a protective infrastructure in these networks has turned
them into convenient targets for various perils. This is the main
impulse why MSNs carry disparate and intricate safety concerns
and embrace divergent safety challenging problems. In this paper,
we aim to provide a clear categorization on safety challenges and
a deep exploration over some recent solutions in MSNs. This work
narrows the safety challenges and solution techniques down from
OppNets and delay-tolerant networks to MSNs with the hope of
covering all the work proposed around security, privacy, and trust
in MSNs. To conclude, several major open research issues are
discussed, and future research directions are outlined.
Index Terms—Mobile social networks (MSNs), opportunistic
communications, privacy, security, trust.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE INCREASE in the number of mobile devices hasenabled users to be ubiquitously connected through wire-
less and mobile communications technologies. However, unlike
conventional mobile ad hoc networks, persistent connectivity
is not a necessity in every type of network. This has led to a
totally progressive kind of social network called mobile social
networks (MSNs). MSNs can be viewed as modern kinds of
delay-tolerant networks (DTNs) in which mobile users interact
with each other to share user-centric data objects among inter-
ested observers.
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MSNs have mainly been introduced by combining social
networks from social science and mobile communication net-
works. In this way, not only can users utilize the knowledge of
their relationship to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
network services, but they can also access, share, and distribute
data in a mobile environment by exploiting the social relations.
Compared to online social networks, MSNs reflect social in-
teractions more realistically. This is because mobile phones are
more common than Internet-based communications in every-
day life.
There is a consensus among researchers who discern two
groups of MSNs [1], [2]: centralized MSNs, which use social
network services for acquiring information through mobile
devices, and decentralized MSNs in which communication is
performed opportunistically using wireless technologies such
as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. Decentralized social networks have a
lot in common with opportunistic networks (OppNets) [3] and
DTNs [4], [5]. However, in contrast to OppNets and DTNs, de-
centralized networks mostly attempt to exploit complex social
similarities and behaviors (such as community and friendship)
between mobile carriers to establish social-aware protocols and
approaches and enhance data-forwarding models.
As MSNs inherit part of their characteristics from OppNets
and DTNs, a quick overview of safety challenges and solutions
in OppNets and DTNs [6]–[9] is necessary. However, having
included social aspects, MSNs encompass more complex and
correlated challenging safety problems than other types of
networks, although like any other modern model of technology,
MSNs depend upon time to be totally safe and immune. To
overcome such a goal, a clear classification on safety issues in
MSNs seems to be a necessity. It makes it possible to identify
concerns, investigate brand new solutions, and evolve suitable
approaches in order to prevent any obstacle from reflecting
on major parts of safety. Safety problems involve a variety of
closely related aspects. In this paper, we will focus on three of
them, i.e., trust, security, and privacy, due to their increasing
importance in the field of MSNs.
Safety can be described as the condition of being protected
against different types of failure, damage, error, accidents,
harm, or any other nondesirable event. In early works, like
[6], the term security was used to convey this meaning, but
later, with the emergence of various networks and safety issues,
security has been specified to a more technical concept. What
we mean by safety in this paper is to be in control of recognized
hazards and to achieve an acceptable level of trust, security,
and privacy. This can take the form of protection from an event
or exposure to something that causes damage. It includes the
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protection of users or their possessions (information, identity,
location, etc.).
Trust in MSNs is defined as the willingness of a particular
node to rely on the actions of a node or nodes in a mobile social
environment. This reliance directly impacts the network safety,
and this is the main reason that we consider trust as the first
component of safety in MSNs. Being specific cases of peer to
peer (P2P) networks, MSNs suffer from the lack of designated
routers. This lack of infrastructure turns MSNs to a vulnerable
target for various attacks due to the existence of malicious
nodes which do not comply with the network protocol. This can
directly endanger trustworthiness. Although specific protocols
have been designed to achieve malignity prevention [10]–[22],
different models have been integrated to develop the assorted
trustworthiness [23]–[29] throughout the mobile networks. The
cooperation between nodes is therefore vital for independent
communication from which forwarding strategies are adopted.
However, the increase of selfish behavior among nodes, as a
result of the scarcity of resources, can endanger this cooperation
in MSNs. In order to overcome such an obstacle, selfishness
discouragement [30]–[37] and cooperation enforcement [38]–
[40] have been designed and applied in the network to improve
confidence among nodes so that nodes are able to rely on one
another and perform networking operations efficiently.
Security is another component of safety which is not unique
to MSNs. The fundamental aim of security is to protect the
information and the resources against attacks and misbehavior
throughout the network. In order to unify endpoint security
technology and define security policies, scholars have equipped
MSNs with access controls [41]–[47] as a means of classical
defense. However, one cannot suffice to this method alone.
Other precautions such as confidentiality techniques [48]–[55]
are needed to prevent information disclosure and manipulation
of unauthorized individuals or groups. Despite the implementa-
tion of both classical defense and confidentiality schemes, there
are always some leaky links that allow an intruder to gain unau-
thorized access to a protected network and exploit it. To tackle
such attacks, a set of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) [56]–
[58] has been used to monitor a network and produce reports
about any malicious activities or policy violations throughout
the network.
Privacy is the last aspect of safety in MSNs that has recently
gained unprecedented attention. This is particularly because of
the social aspect of MSNs in which information relevance like
users’ location and identity is considered critical issues for both
the attackers and system administrators. Many researchers have
suggested ways to reveal users’ information selectively and for
them to remain unnoticed or unidentified over the network. To
do this, privacy preferences are generally specified to obfuscate
[59]–[66] users’ private information and present it in a coarser
and falsified manner. Moreover, fairness encouragement [67]–
[71] strategies have been included to prevent heavy congestion
in a particular collaborative node. The goal is to encourage
nodes to forward messages and distribute their private infor-
mation equally. This prevents malicious nodes from intruding
into the network and gaining an unauthorized access to valu-
able resources. Furthermore, as attackers are in direct correla-
tion with the personal profiles in MSNs, methods for private
matching [72]–[82] have been designed to let two users conceal
their personal profiles while in connection. To deliver location-
based services in MSNs, privacy should be maintained. It can
be achieved through different techniques such as obfuscation-
based schemes [83]–[85], social-based schemes [86]–[89], dy-
namic pseudonymity [90]–[93], and key anonymity [94]–[96].
Meanwhile, the information of each individual should be pro-
tected while communicating with the other, so communication
privacy [97], [98] should be considered vital for every network.
Due to the epic correlations between safety issues and the
inordinate area that they cover, a clear categorization to dis-
tinguish their characteristics has seemed too ambitious for
researchers. This paper aims to provide a clear categorization on
safety challenges and a deep exploration over some recent secu-
rity, privacy, and trust solutions in MSNs. It narrows the safety
challenges and techniques down from OppNets and DTNs to
MSNs and tries to cover all the work proposed around security,
privacy, and trust in MSNs. To the best of our knowledge, it is
the first attempt to classify safety challenges in MSNs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II offers an overview of safety challenges and solutions
in MSNs. Section III introduces trust as the first element of
safety in MSNs and focuses on its characteristics, challenges,
and given solutions. An ideal categorization of all the different
forms of trust is presented in this section. Section IV addresses
security as the second key element of safety issues in MSNs.
In this section, security-preserving approaches are discussed in
detail, and a clear classification of related works is displayed.
Section V concentrates on privacy as the third main category of
safety challenges and solution in MSNs. To conclude, several
major open research issues are discussed, and future research
directions are outlined in Section VI.
II. SAFETY CHALLENGES IN MSNS
MSNs are considered as a particular type of OppNets, and
they share a lot of common characteristics with OppNets and
DTNs. As a result, MSNs cover some of the safety concerns
related to OppNets as their challenges are partially the same.
The first set of works to distinguish safety challenges in an
OppNet goes back to the introduction of OppNets. Lilien et al.
[6] were the first to propose OppNets along with a classification
of safety challenges, containing privacy and security, in six
different steps. They proposed a general safety scheme for Opp-
Nets in five mandatory functions in the absence of initial au-
thentication mechanism. Another categorization was deployed
in [7] where safety challenges in opportunistic people-centric
sensing were studied and general suggestions to make solutions
were discussed. Further attempts to classify safety issues in
opportunistic communication were made by Shikfa [8]. This
work itemizes basic challenges in OppNets into authenticity,
confidentiality, cooperation enforcement, trust establishment,
and integrity privacy according to the concerns provided.
MSNs include more vital and complex safety concerns in
comparison to other resembling networks and contain tons
of safety challenging problems, specifically in trust, security,
and privacy. There have been few attempts proposing a clear
categorization of safety in MSNs. To take an example of these
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Fig. 1. Safety challenges in MSNs in three main classes, namely, trust, security, and privacy, expanded in ten subclasses and their belonging attributes to provide
a safe mobile social environment for users’ communication.
efforts, Beach et al. [9] presented issues around privacy and
security for MSNs, along with some methods and implemen-
tation for their solutions. They classified problematic issues
in three groups, namely: direct anonymity issues, indirect or
k-anonymity issues, and attacks (eavesdropping, spoofing,
replay, and wormhole). Furthermore, they expanded their
proposition by designing an identity server (IS) which adopts
established privacy and security technologies to provide solu-
tions for these problems.
Although some efforts have been made to take safety is-
sues into consideration and make a classifiable observation
to enumerate safety challenges and solutions in MSNs, they
have been neither comprehensive nor detailed. As far as we
know, there has never been an obvious categorization followed
by a comprehensive clarification on MSN safety issues. To
do this, we classify these issues in three main groups, trust,
security, and privacy, and explain noble and novel approaches
for possible solutions, as outlined in Fig. 1.
III. TRUST
Trust is a critical determinant of sharing information and de-
veloping new relationships in a network. In other words, trust is
based on the reputation between individuals and is a capital as-
set that people may invest great amount of resources in building
and that is acquired slowly but can be destroyed very quickly.
In traditional networks, trust relies mainly on the infrastructure,
and this infrastructure is trusted by end users to fulfill the
routing task and provides naming service which also simplifies
the establishment of trust between users. Furthermore, when
higher level of trust is required, the network infrastructure can
be complemented by a safe infrastructure. In OppNets, there
is no routing infrastructure with dedicated routers, and peer
nodes act as message carriers and forwarders instead. Not only
is there no naming service accessible, but also identifiers are
meaningless from a trust perspective. It is therefore important in
OppNets to first build trust among parties so that they can rely
on one another. Including social context into the information
generation and delivery process provides greater assurance
for receiving trustworthy content. Maintaining trust demands
special mechanisms and protocols in MSNs. We categorize
social trust schemes according to their mechanisms for the
following: 1) malignity prevention; 2) assorted trustworthiness;
3) selfishness discouragement; and 4) cooperation enforcement.
A. Malignity Prevention
Trust retention over interactive networks partially relies on
the robustness of protocols to defend against malicious nodes.
These nodes give erroneous responses to a query, either by
returning false data or returning false routing information.
Among different kinds of attacks, there are two common attacks
in MSNs: Sybil attack and black-hole attack. The following
section discusses the mechanisms of these two types of attacks
along with some solutions proposed to resist them.
1) Sybil Attack: Sybil attack [10] is one of the basic ma-
licious actions in MSNs which describes an attempt to create
many identities in order to gain a larger effect in a reputation
system (RS). It is very common to employ a trusted certi-
fication center to verify the physical identity for preventing
multiple-identity attacks. These types of attacks usually use a
single malicious node to confuse neighboring nodes and equip
a malicious user with the capability to create a relationship
with honest users. When one honest user is compromised, a
malicious user will gain special privileges which can be used
for an attack. Fig. 2 demonstrates an example of this attack in a
mobile social environment.
In order to detect such attacks, Piro et al. [11] observed
that Sybil users should only communicate serially as it can
cause much fewer collisions at the media access control layer.
Later, Capkun et al. [12] made users able to build certificate
chains similar to the pretty-good-privacy algorithm based on
the assumption of unconditional transitivity of trust along the
chain paths.
Another significant work to detect Sybil attacks was made in
[13]. The main goal of this work is to assess a genuine user in
MSNs with honest intentions by limiting the maximum num-
ber of Sybils independently. In addition, it encompasses two
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Fig. 2. Example of Sybil attack.
Fig. 3. Interconnection of safety channels in PodNetSec [15]: Open, re-
stricted, and closed channels.
distinguished complementary appendages: the explicit and the
implicit social trust. Explicit social trust is based on consciously
established friend ties and calculates trust as a function of hop
distance and interconnection. It conveys trust which, in terms of
identity, is not Sybil and verifies the honesty of the user’s inten-
tions. Implicit social trust leverages mobility properties to con-
vey trust in the originality of identities due to their persistency.
Their further proposition was to optimize the trust level of the
initial version of PodNet [14]. In this version, content publi-
cation was done anonymously, making it an ideal platform for
spams and illegal contents to be spread. They proposed an inte-
grated safe framework called PodNetSec [15] which contains
three types of channels, namely, open, restricted, and closed
channels, as shown in Fig. 3. Closed channels allow the private
and encrypted dissemination of content in a limited group.
Restricted channels only allow authorized users to publish con-
tent but allow everybody to consume it. Open channels allow
every user to consume as well as create new content. Although
this work mainly focuses on trust in OppNets, having the
ability to maintain trust in an anonymous content-publication
environment makes it possible to be implemented in MSNs.
Although malicious users can create many identities in a
Sybil attack, they can only establish few trust relationships. In
other words, there is always a small cut in the graph between
the Sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard [16] exploits
this property to limit the number of identities that a malicious
user can create. However, this scheme has been designed for
P2P networks and is not applicable in mobile networks. MobID
[17] is a decentralized defense for portable devices which dif-
ferentiates between friends’ network (containing honest nodes)
and foes’ network (containing suspicious nodes). By reasoning
on these two networks, the node is able to determine whether an
unknown node is carrying out a Sybil attack. Another important
approach to defend against Sybil attacks in social networks is
called SybilDefender [18]. It can identify the Sybil nodes and
detect the Sybil community around a Sybil node, even when the
number of Sybil nodes introduced by each attack edge is close
to the theoretically detectable lower bound. Based on perform-
ing a limited number of random walks within the social graphs,
SybilDefender is efficient and scalable to large social networks.
Most of social network-based Sybil defense mechanisms
exploit the algorithmic properties of social graphs to infer
the extent to which an arbitrary node in such a graph should
be trusted. However, these approaches neither consider the
different amounts of trust represented by different graphs nor
consider the inherent trust properties of the graphs that they
use. To tackle this weakness, Mohaisen et al. [19] evaluated
the performances of anti-Sybil algorithms and compared them
using the cost function. The cost function is the required length
of random walks in the social graph to accept all honest nodes.
They found that the cost function in high-trust graphs is much
higher than that in low-trust ones in a social network. They
proposed several designs to model trust in social networks to
increase the cost function of social graphs with low-trust value
which directly decreases the advantage of the attacker.
2) Black-Hole Attack: Black hole [20] is a type of denial of
service (DoS) attack which targets trust. In this type of attack,
a malicious node, in reply to its given path request (PREQ),
sends a forged path replay packet to a source node that initiates
the route discovery. This is because the malicious node pretends
to be a destination node itself or an immediate neighbor of the
destination node. As a result, the source node will forward all
of its data packets to the malicious node. Fig. 4 describes an
example of this attack.
To prevent such an attack, Li and Das [21] designed a trust-
based framework and later integrated it [22] with a large family
of existing single-copy data-forwarding protocols to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of an encounter’s ability to deliver
data. Their framework not only resists black-hole attack but also
contracts arbitrarily forwarding attacks, effectively contributing
to three major components: positive forwarding message, a
trust-based framework, and data-forwarding protocol.
B. Assorted Trustworthiness
Assorted trustworthiness refers to a system or group of sys-
tems that aim to maintain trust across a network by integrating
different models, schemes, or mechanisms. In the following
two sections, we will discuss these systems in two different
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Fig. 4. Example demonstrating a black-hole attack in which source node is
attacked in reply to its path request.
groups, including sensor-engaged systems and trust-
management systems.
1) Sensor-Engaged Systems: While sensor-engaged appli-
cations do not seem to be widely deployed opportunistically,
there have been efforts in creating opportunistic sensing sys-
tems. An interesting project is CenceMe [23] which facilitates
sharing information throughout the social network. The main
strategy is to leverage the growing integration of sensors into
off-the-shelf consumer devices. Later, Zhao et al. [24] pre-
sented a collaboration model that can further be developed and
used in opportunistic sensing systems to obtain a neutrality
policy from the injecting sensors or users.
To retrieve social informatics properly and safely, it is im-
portant to design a system that enhances the management
of social data. To do this, a social computing paradigm was
proposed [25] which is a concept to promote innovative and
collaborative cybersecurity models, particularly pervasive trust-
worthy computing in opportunistic sensing networks. It takes
advantage of the integration of sensors, applications, and online
social networks. Given the availability of both digitized social
informatics and sensor contents, this approach allows users to
examine these sources simultaneously.
2) Trust-Management Systems: The aim of trust manage-
ment is to aid the automated decision-making process with
results of trust assessment in social networks. One of the
important studies in this area is a framework for OppNets called
trust-management system [22] which basically consists of two
elements, a watchdog and an RS. The watchdog monitors the
real routing behavior of a node, feeding that information into
the RS to update the reputation of that node. The RS updates
reputation opinions based on the direct observation of the
watchdog. In addition, it integrates reputation by combining the
indirect information, from other members, with first-hand infor-
mation. Another function of RS is to perform reputation aging.
The aging is a self-updating mechanism and is used when fresh
first-hand information is not available for a long period of time.
Although many trust-management systems have been pro-
posed, a few of them can be applied to MSNs due to their
unique communication characteristics. To achieve this goal,
a trust-management system called MobiTrust [26] was pro-
posed which establishes secure, reliable, and accurate trust
relationships between network participants in MSNs. It encom-
passes three key factors associated with the similarity of user
profile, reputation, and history of friendship.
Managing reputation in large-scale trust-management sys-
tems can be problematic. This is especially true because com-
puting the marginal probability functions in large-scale systems
is computationally prohibitive. To address this problem, Be-
lief Propagation-Iterative Trust and Reputation Management
(BP-ITRM) [27] was proposed. It is an iterative probabilistic
and belief propagation-based approach in the design and eval-
uation of trust and reputation management systems. It utilizes
the belief propagation algorithm to efficiently compute these
marginal probability distributions. This approach models the
RS on a factor graph, which chiefly has two benefits. The first
advantage of using such a graph is the ability to obtain a qualita-
tive representation of how the consumers and service providers
are related on a graphical structure. The second advantage is
that, by using such a factor graph, the global functions can be
included in products with simpler local functions, each of which
depends on a subset of the variables. In addition, BP-ITRM al-
lows a message to be passed between nodes in the graph in order
to compute the marginal probability distribution functions of
the variables representing the reputation values. Furthermore,
BP-ITRM is reliable in filtering out malicious reports, and it
reduces the error in the reputation values of service providers
caused by the high probability of malicious raters.
Many trust-management models try to minimize the threats
to evaluate the trust and reputation of the interacting agents.
However, when malicious agents start to behave in an unpre-
dictable way, they fail to properly evaluate trust. Moreover,
most of these models are not capable of distributing work-
load among service providers. To surmount these problems,
a dynamic trust computation model called SecuredTrust [28]
was suggested. It is a comprehensive quantitative model for
measuring such trust with a load-balancing algorithm based on
different factors to perform workload distribution effectively.
A perfect example of trust-management systems in service-
oriented MSNs is Trustworthy Service Evaluation (TSE) [29]
in which service providers can collect and store users’ re-
views about their services without requiring any third trusted
authority. The service reviews can then be made available to
interested users for making service selection decisions. TSE
consists of two subsystems: basic TSE and Sybil-resisted TSE.
Basic TSE enables users to submit their reviews by using
hierarchical and aggregate signature techniques in a distributed
and cooperative manner. It restricts the service providers by not
allowing them to reject, modify, or delete the reviews. Sybil-
resisted TSE enables the detection of typical Sybil attacks. It
reveals the real identity of the user who intends to generate
multiple reviews toward a vendor in a predefined time slot with
different pseudonyms.
C. Selfishness Discouragement
While intermediate nodes are expected to help each other to
store, carry, and forward packets in a cooperative and oppor-
tunistic fashion, in reality, these nodes are so rational that they
communicate with relative nodes rather than devote their own
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valuable resources to serve the network. This phenomenon is
called selfishness and has been classified into two basic groups,
namely, individual selfishness and social selfishness. We will
elaborate these types of selfishness and some recent approaches
to handle them in the following two sections.
1) Individual Selfishness: Individual selfish nodes tend to
get help from others rather than helping them to accrue their
own orientations. To impose cooperation among individual
selfish nodes, different incentive schemes were proposed. These
schemes mainly try to let the nodes gain utility according to the
degree of help that they spread over the network. Reputation-
based schemes [30] make individual nodes responsible for
monitoring traffic and reputation in the vicinity. Their aim is
to pinpoint uncooperative nodes and exclude them from the
networks. On the other hand, credit-based schemes [31] regu-
late the packet forwarding relationships among different nodes
using virtual currency.
An interesting example on reputation-based schemes is
SUCCESS [32]. It is a secure user-centric and social-aware
reputation-based incentive scheme for DTNs that allows a
node to manage its reputation evidence and demonstrate its
reputation whenever necessary. It mainly relies on neighboring
nodes to monitor the traffic and keep track of each other’s
reputation. In this paper, two concepts, notably self-check and
community check, were defined to evaluate reputation and speed
up the reputation establishment. Probably, the best example of a
credit-based scheme is SMART [33]. It uses credits, composed
of multiple layers, to provide incentives to selfish nodes. Credits
are distributed among DTN nodes through a bundle-forwarding
cooperative manner without dependence on any tamper-proof
hardware. Using its concentration technique, SMART makes
each intermediate node able to generate a new credit layer,
based on the previous layers. This credit generation is com-
pleted by adding a nonforgeable digital signature which implies
that the forwarding node agrees to provide forwarding service.
However, none of the reputation-based and credit-based
schemes is specifically designed to solve individual selfish be-
havior in MSNs. Give2Get [34] is probably the only individual
selfishness solution introduced specifically for MSNs which
contains two forwarding protocols to force faithful behavior. It
considerably reduces the number of forwarding messages, which
leads to positive side effects and performance improvements.
2) Social Selfishness: Social selfishness is closely related
to not only the willingness intention for forwarding but also
the trusted relationship between nodes. Social selfish nodes
prefer to ask the influential nodes with more social relations
to help them forward the packets. This type of selfishness is
widely evident in MSNs and causes serious moderations in the
network performance. One of the first approaches in this area
was proposed in [35] which studies the impact of different dis-
tributions of selfishness, including the impact of topologies and
traffic patterns. This work evaluates the system performance
using four experimental human mobility traces with uniform
and community-biased traffic patterns. The authors found that,
due to the nature of multiple paths, MSNs are resilient against
the distributions of social selfish behavior.
In order to resolve such selfishness, trust-based strategies
often establish trusted relationship to complete trusted routing
by coping with social selfishness. One of these approaches is
a social selfishness aware routing called SSAR [36]. It allows
user selfishness by considering users’ willingness and their
contact opportunity to prepare a better forwarding strategy than
purely contact-based approaches. Later, Xin et al. [37] intro-
duced a virtual bank to avoid social selfishness. It uses a reward
system and distributes it throughout the participating nodes in
the packet forwarding process. Taxation strategy is also adopted
to redistribute rewards among poverty isolated nodes that have
the potential to become the malicious nodes. This protects con-
sequential internal threats caused by the social discrimination.
D. Cooperation Enforcement
Cooperation is the process of working or acting together
which involves things working in harmony and can be accom-
plished by handling shared time and resources simultaneously.
The fundamental challenge in mobile networks, regardless of
the application, is to enable node cooperation to forward a
message.
One of the finest mechanisms for node cooperation was
proposed in [38]. The main aim of this work is to investigate
the potential impact of the lack of trust on node cooperation.
It leverages social information and proposes six trust-based
filters to establish trustworthy communications over mobile
OppNets. The six filters couple three socially aware estimators
of trust, including common interests, common friends, and the
distance in the social graph, with two major techniques of trust
establishment, including relay-to-relay and source-to-relay. It
has been shown that the trust filters yield a fair tradeoff between
trust and success rate.
In order to establish cooperation between nodes in OppNets,
the authors in [39] highlighted trusted devices through the direct
and the indirect observation and created policies in which nodes
compromise to obtain a service. In other words, their method
obtains direct past experience using direct observation while
indirect ones are for using recommendations. A noncollabo-
rative fading parameter that decreases the reputation values of
users is considered. Another strategy to make users collaborate,
which seems applicable for MSNs, was proposed in [40] in
which users are obliged to be cooperative by handling essential
and effective messages throughout the network while messages
are either primary or secondary. Messages that are considered
to be essential for a device itself are called primary, whereas
secondary messages are useful for other users and carrying
them is proof of the cooperation between the devices. By using
a barter exchange, a user receives a message only if it provides
the same number of messages to the other participant.
In Table I, a demonstration of our categorization in trust-
based schemes is given. We mostly focused on the functionality
of socially compatible schemes rather than some schemes that
target trust in an unsocial manner.
IV. SECURITY
Network information security is concerned with the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability of data, regardless of the
form that the data may take. However, the security services of
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TABLE I
DEMONSTRATION OF SOME RECENT SAFETY SCHEMES IN TRUST CATEGORY IN MSNs
OppNets are not altogether different from those of other net-
work communication paradigms. The general goal of security
maintenance is to protect the information and the resources
from attacks and misbehavior throughout the network. Require-
ments to ensure an effective security paradigm can be explained
as availability, authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity. On the
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Fig. 5. Example of access control establishment to secure a mobile network
using authentication and key management system.
other hand, MSNs are defined as specific opportunistic P2P
networks which do not have an access point in between them.
Having little protection, these types of networks usually employ
encryption methods to provide security. An attacker, however,
may try to break the encryption of the network; hence, secu-
rity policies were defined. These policies address constraints
on functions and access of external attacks, adversaries, and
unauthorized users. To offer a comprehensive study on MSN
security issues, we put them in three groups: 1) access control
to exert control over interactive nodes; 2) confidentiality to
ensure that a given message cannot be understood by anyone
else other than its desired recipients; and 3) intrusion detection
to monitor the network for malicious activities or policy viola-
tions. In the following sections, we will elaborate on these three
categories.
A. Access Control
Network access control is an approach to unify endpoint
security technology, user or system authentication, and network
security enforcement. It uses a set of protocols to define and
implement policies that describe how to secure access to net-
work nodes by devices when they initially attempt to access the
network. However, using it in a mobile deployment involves
challenges. When a user is denied access because of a security
concern, the productive use of the device is lost, which can
affect the ability to complete a job or serve a customer.
Modern mobile network access control solutions give system
administrators greater control over when, how, and whether
to remediate the security concern. They also combine access
policies with cryptographic approaches and key management
techniques to maintain an efficient level of security over the
network. Fig. 5 illustrates an example of the collaboration of
authentication and key management system to establish a safe
and secure communication over a mobile network. In general,
access control-related approaches in MSNs fall into three cat-
egories, depending on their mechanisms: group-based access
control, attribute-based access control, and policy-based access
Fig. 6. Group-based access control using fine-grained access policy [40] to
share items securely in a mobile network.
control. The next three sections discuss these categories in
detail.
1) Group-Based Access Control: The base of group-based
access control in MSNs lies in a general cryptographic scheme
for OppNets called HiBOp [41] which divides users into com-
munities in order to communicate safely. It uses public-key
cryptography and selects specific nodes to forward messages
between communities. This approach provides basic security
for an opportunistic environment. It is therefore considered
an important work because it was the base of many other
consequent methods. Group-based cryptography is one of these
methods by Shikfa et al. [42] which is first used for OppNets.
The aim of this work is to prevent data from being accessed by
different groups, using multiple levels of cryptography. Later,
Graffi et al. [43] introduced a solution to enable authenticated
and secure communication between MSN users. This method
establishes a trust infrastructure which provides personalized
fine-grained data access control. Using this method, all com-
munications are encrypted with the public key of the receiver,
whereas secure and authenticated communications are provided
once the node identification (ID) of the receiver is known. Any
node may retrieve and replicate these data, but only privileged
users can decrypt it. Fig. 6 explains this approach, where two
nodes share items and implement fine-grained access policies
and group-based encryption to maintain a secure connection.
2) Attribute-Based Access Control: This kind of access
control uses attribute-based encryption techniques in which
a sender encrypts a data packet with an access policy and
a receiver decrypts the packet and reads its content only if
its attributes satisfy the access policy. An example of the
schemes which use such techniques is called secure symptom-
based handshake (SSH) [44]. It is a privacy-preserving personal
profile matching scheme which tackles challenging security
issues for m-Healthcare social network. Using this scheme,
each patient is granted with a pseudo-ID and its own private key
corresponding to his/her symptom. When two patients meet,
they can use their private keys to make mutual authentication,
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only if they have the same symptom. SSH satisfies three proper-
ties, namely, correctness, impersonator resistance, and detector
resistance.
Although SSH is very efficient in a mobile social environ-
ment, several security and privacy issues (i.e., resisting inside
attacks) must be addressed through MSNs in advance. To do
this, Xiaohui et al. proposed an efficient and secure user revoca-
tion scheme [45]. It uses attribute-based encryption techniques
to enable a trusted authority in order to monitor the data
decryption capability of mobile social users. This scheme not
only does disable malicious users from decrypting any data
packet but also encourages proper user behavior to decimate
inside attacks. It has also the ability to resist attribute collusion
and revoke collusion attacks.
3) Policy-Based Access Control: Policy-based access con-
trol provides a powerful and flexible means of protecting data,
down to the row level. Using this type of access control,
administrators can define security policies that are based on the
value of individual data elements, and the server can enforce
these policies transparently. In other words, it simplifies both
the security administration of an adaptive server installation and
the application development process because it is the server that
enforces security.
An example of policy-based access control for P2P networks
was proposed in [46]. It is a framework for dynamic multilevel
access control policies based on trust and reputation. This
framework allows a group to switch between policies over time,
influenced by the system’s state or environment. Based on the
behavior and trust level of peers in the group and the current
group composition, it is possible for peers to collaboratively
modify policies such as join, update, and job allocation.
In MSNs, Hachem et al. [47] propose a policy framework
for controlling access to social data in mobile applications.
This framework allows the representation of expressive policies
based on users’ social interactions while keeping policy model
compatibility. In other words, it combines expressivity with
personalization in MSNs. They integrate the policy framework
as part of a middleware for managing mobile users’ social
ecosystems to enforce policy-based access control on hetero-
geneous devices with minimal deployment effort.
B. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the term used to prevent the disclosure of
information to unauthorized individuals or systems. In other
words, it means that no one can gain, read, or manipulate
information other than for whom it is intended. Basically, con-
fidentiality is achieved in two steps: encryption and decryption.
Using encryption, the sender converts plaintext to ciphertext
with the aim of rendering it unintelligible to parties except
the intended recipient. Using decryption, ciphertext is rendered
intelligible to the intended recipient by converting it back to
the plaintext. The foundations of confidentiality have not been
changed in OppNets, DTNs, and MSNs. Therefore, owing to
the vast utilization of asymmetric cryptography in this area,
new categorizations have been made. The next two sections
highlight our confidentiality in two basic groups: identity confi-
dentiality and location confidentiality.
Fig. 7. Use of an IS, proposed in [6], to establish identity confidentiality in
MSNs.
1) Identity Confidentiality: The identity of the nodes in a
mobile network is an important item which should be protected.
To do this, many approaches have been made. To take an exam-
ple, Spring [48] is a privacy-preserving protocol for vehicular
DTNs which aims to achieve conditional privacy preservation
and resist most of the attacks. Another example is the work
proposed by El Defrawy et al. [49]. This work focuses on the
problem of initial secure context establishment in DTNs and
allows users to leverage social contacts to exchange confidential
and authentic messages. To develop security infrastructure in
DTNs, Patra et al. [50] suggested the employment of identity-
based cryptography to let a source derive the destination public
key from some associated identity strings. A complementary
work in this area is a dynamic virtual digraph model [51] for
public-key distribution study. Extending the graph theory and
distinguishing between owners and carriers, this model presents
a public-key distribution scheme for pocket DTNs based on
two-channel cryptography.
Identity confidentiality establishment in unstructured Opp-
Nets, like MSNs, is discussed in a project called cloud [52]
which is an end-to-end transportation standard. This project
stresses ambiguity and intelligence resistant search function-
ality for the semantic OppNets. Ambiguity is satisfied in the
emergence of high connectivity among the same hosts. It results
in hosts hiding their identity within groups of semantically
close network. A cryptographic standard also takes care of
counterintelligence by protecting unidentified transmission be-
tween the source and the destination. The mechanism used in
this project is independent of any earlier sent messages. This is
can be very beneficial because it guarantees the confidentiality
of the supplies.
Being independent, however, can have its own drawback.
This is because it avoids centralized communication and assures
competence to break strong transmission between hosts. To
compensate this flaw, Beach et al. [9] proposed the use of an
anonymous identifier (AID). Generally, AID is a nonce that is
generated by a trusted server, called the IS, to provide solutions
for clear text exchange threats. As depicted in Fig. 7, before
a source mobile node advertises the user’s presence to other
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Fig. 8. Example of location cheating against a foursquare server.
nearby nodes and stationary devices, it securely contacts the IS
to obtain the AID. The IS generates a new AID, using a cryp-
tographic hash function, and associates it with the destination
mobile node that made the request. Then, the destination node
or stationary device discovers this AID sharing service on the
source node. Eventually, it establishes a connection to obtain
the shared AID, so the source node would be able to make a
request for another AID from the IS, which is to be shared
with the next mobile or stationary device. This scheme was later
expanded by suggesting a secure social-aware [53] framework
to make interactions of real-world location-based services of
MSNs. This framework helps exchange an encrypted nonce
combined to a verified user location without any use for user
privacy and security adjustment.
2) Location Confidentiality: Most MSN applications rely
on accurate location information, which makes location an
important asset for nodes throughout the network. One of the
examples of location confidentiality approaches was proposed
by Gongjun et al. [54]. The aim of this work is to provide a
set of location information security mechanisms to meet the
requirements of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability in
vehicular ad hoc networks. To do that, a set of location security
mechanisms such as onboard radar devices and GPS has been
integrated. The proposed method is capable of enhancing the
availability of location information by selecting and maintain-
ing stable routing paths.
An interesting example of location attacks called location
cheating attack [55] was proposed. It has the ability to pass
the current location verification mechanism in MSN services.
Fig. 8 portrays an example of location cheating which targets
a foursquare server in a mobile environment. This attack has a
simple but efficient mechanism. Basically, the location cheater
creates a fake location and forces the server to reveal that
location. As soon as the server connects to the falsified location,
the connection between the true location and the server is
blocked. The authors categorized possible solutions against it
and provided insights into the defending mechanisms. In this
paper, location verification techniques, namely, distance bound-
ing, address mapping, and venue side location verification,
were employed to excess resistance. To mitigate the threats,
Fig. 9. Example of bypassing security and access by an intruder caught by
IDS in a mobile network environment.
however, access control for crawling and hiding information
from profiles was recognized.
C. Intrusion Detection
Network intrusion is an important attack in which a malicious
user gains unauthorized access to a protected network. To tackle
such attacks, detection and prevention methods have been used
as proactive security measures, rather than waiting for an actual
intrusion to occur. No matter how many intrusion prevention
measures are inserted in a network, there are always some weak
links that one could exploit to break in. IDSs monitor a network
and produce reports about any malicious activities or policy
violations throughout the network. The reports can be kept
in a data set to be utilized for submitting brand new security
policies. Some IDSs are equipped with alerting mechanisms
to produce real-time reports about any intrusions. Some others
try to stop an intrusion attempt by dropping the malicious
packets, resetting the connection, and blocking the traffic from
the offenders. Fig. 9 illustrates an example of IDS that monitors
the mobile network and catches an intruder who gained an
unauthorized access to the mobile network, bypassing security
authorization and access policies.
Unlike wired networks, where extra protection can be placed
on routers and gateways, an adversary node could paralyze
the entire wireless network by disseminating false routing
information. Such false routing information could result in
messages from all nodes being fed to the compromised node.
From a system security perspective, there have been efforts
on designing IDSs [56] for pervasive computing. IDSs can
be broadly divided into three classes: misuse detection (often
also called signature-based detection), anomaly detection, and
specification-based detection. Anomaly detection tries to look
for behaviors that deviate from normal and expected behaviors.
Statistical techniques are used to infer an anomaly; however,
this can lead to false positives.
The internal of an intrusion detection agent for mobile
networks [57] can be structured into six pieces. The data
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Fig. 10. Exterior and the interior design of intrusion detection agents and their
cooperation in mobile network environment.
collection module gathers local audit traces and activity logs,
which are utilized by the local detection engine to detect
local anomaly. The cooperative detection engine fulfills the
necessity of broader data sets or intrusion detection agents’
collaborations. Intrusion response actions are provided by both
the local response and global response modules. The local
response module triggers actions local to this mobile node
while the global one coordinates actions among neighboring
nodes. Finally, there exists a secure communication module,
which provides a secure communication channel among intru-
sion detection agents. Fig. 10 demonstrates IDS architecture for
mobile networks along with its interior design.
An interesting project in this area which fits in well with
MSNs was proposed by Wang et al. [58]. It is a cooperative
intrusion detection architecture, which relies on a detection
engine to utilize social network analysis methods. In this ar-
chitecture, each node deploys an intrusion detection engine that
performs detections using audit data received from its “ego”
network. The deployed engines operate similarly to anomaly
detection, but they utilize social relations as metrics of interest.
They require less computational overhead compared to stan-
dard anomaly detection engines. This architecture is composed
of three modules: data preprocessing module to collect and
preprocess the audit data, social analysis module to perform
intrusion detection, and response module to integrate local and
global intrusion alerts. Table II portrays our classification of
security and discusses related approaches briefly.
V. PRIVACY
Network privacy is the ability of an individual or group
to reveal its information selectively and remain unnoticed
or unidentified over the network. It encompasses anonymity,
information blurring, and furtiveness of exchanged messages
between intermediate nodes. The level of privacy in MSNs
depends on the application, the point of view (sender, receiver,
intermediate node, and outside observer), and the level of the
trust between entities. In the case of context-based forwarding,
the context of the message is directly linked to the profile
of the destination and is considered as private. The context
should therefore be protected (encrypted) while the informa-
tion about the shared context should be revealed. This raises
the problem of computation on encrypted data. In the case
of content-based forwarding, preserving the privacy of users
mainly consists of protecting their interests. In this case, users
want to receive content corresponding to their interests without
revealing them. However, user privacy and forwarding present
conflicting requirements. The first requires the encryption of the
interests, while the second requires access to the filters. This
raises another problem of computation on encrypted data. To
clarify privacy challenges in MSNs, we have partitioned them
into the following different classes according to their behavior:
1) obfuscation; 2) fairness encouragement; 3) private matching;
4) location privacy; and 5) communication privacy.
A. Obfuscation
Privacy preferences are generally specified to govern context
exchange among nodes in ubiquitous environments. Aside from
who has rights to see what information, a user’s privacy pref-
erence could also designate who has rights to have what obfus-
cated information. By obfuscation, people are able to present
their private information in a coarser granularity, or simply in a
falsified manner, depending on the specific situations. In other
words, obfuscation is a form of data masking where data are
purposely scrambled to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive
materials. This form of encryption results in unintelligible or
confusing data.
A popular and traditional mechanism for privacy enhance-
ment and anonymous communication over a network is onion
routing [59]. Using this mechanism, messages are repeatedly
encrypted and routed through a group of collaborating nodes
to prevent the intermediary nodes from knowing the origin,
destination, and content of the message. Like someone peeling
an onion, each onion router removes a layer of encryption to
uncover routing instructions and sends the message to the next
router where this is repeated. To combine onion routing and
multicast routing in mobile networks, Aad et al. [60] introduced
methods to improve anonymity by using bloom filters to com-
press and obscure a packet’s routing list.
Aside from onion-based routing schemes, one of the impor-
tant works around privacy is a method called none of your busi-
ness (NOYB) [61] which uses obfuscation to enhance privacy
in social network sites. It combines users’ information from
different sites to prevent an attacker from profiling an individual
user. In order to achieve privacy, this method is equipped with
several mechanisms such as the marginal distribution of the
ciphertext, atom compartmentalization, steganography, public
dictionary, random nonce, standard ciphers, and communica-
tion across different channels. Later, NOYB was extended by
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DEMONSTRATION OF SOME RECENT SAFETY SCHEMES IN SECURITY CATEGORY IN MSNs
a defense strategy called hide-and-lie [62] which obfuscates
users’ interests in an opportunistic publish–subscribe appli-
cation. It simply prevents attackers from identifying a user’s
specific interests. Using this strategy, the success probability of
an attacker can be equalized to the success probability of the
simple guessing. Furthermore, in some scenarios, the hide-and-
lie strategy increases the message delivery ratio.
Another work around obfuscation-based privacy in social
networks was presented in [63]. This work studies the feasi-
bility of perceivable social networks through the comparison of
an anonymous data set to another available social network data
set. One problem with this method is that, to randomize data,
it is necessary to keep the statistics close to the origin, which
will reveal the hidden data themselves. The second problem is
that this method focuses on one-time releases. In other words,
the republication of dynamic social network data has not been
considered in this method.
In order to resolve the first problem and keep the data out
of attackers’ access, Wondracek et al. [64] suggested another
solution. They proved that it is also possible to reveal social
network data if group membership information is public. Later,
an approach consisting of two complementary methods on this
subject was presented by Parris et al. [65]. These methods
enhance privacy in social network routing by obfuscating the
friends’ lists in order to inform routing decisions. To do this,
one-way hashing technique is used which is independent from
any kind of key management schemes. Utilizing three real-
world data sets, this work evaluates the proposed methods
and shows that it is feasible to use such methods without any
reduction in routing performance.
In order to resolve the second problem, the authors in [66]
show that, by utilizing correlations between sequential releases,
the adversary can achieve high precision in the deanonymiza-
tion of the released data. It lets enemies suppress the uncertainty
of reidentifying each release separately and synthesize the
results afterward. In addition, this work suggests a combination
of structural knowledge with node attributes to compromise
graph modification-based defenses.
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Fig. 11. Example of collaboration fairness in a mobile network where inter-
mediate nodes try to take equal responsibility in message delivery.
B. Fairness Encouragement
The concept of fairness is another fundamental issue in
network privacy which generally covers methods of encourag-
ing users to collaborate in a network. In order to clarify, we
have categorized fairness into two major classes: collaboration
fairness and social fairness. The next two sections discuss these
classes in detail.
1) Collaboration Fairness: The first class of fairness, which
we call collaboration fairness, encompasses fair contribution in
message forwarding or longer network settlement. Providing
fairness in this case is crucial since the unfair treatment of
users is considered as a disadvantage to the participation in
the communication process. However, an unfair communica-
tion between nodes causes a heavy congestion in a particular
collaborative node. This node can be a dangerous high potential
point for a malicious node to intrude into the network and gain
an unauthorized access to valuable resources. Fig. 11 displays
a state of collaboration fairness in which all intermediate nodes
are coerced to cooperate and share their communication path in
a relatively equal manner.
Regarding collaboration fairness in OppNets, higher ranked
nodes typically take the responsibility of carrying the largest
burden in message delivery actions, which creates a high po-
tential of dissatisfaction among them. An absolute fair treat-
ment of users, however, causes significant end-to-end delay
and message delivery performance degradation. In other words,
there is a tradeoff between fairness and efficiency since fairness
schemes typically reduce the channel utilization.
It is questionable whether certain fairness schemes have a
positive or negative impact on the quality of service (QoS).
Dramitinos et al. [67] introduced a three-tier utility-base frame-
work, based on history-dependent utility functions and QoS
parameters. The aim of their approach is to quantify the satisfac-
tion of the users from the way that their services are allocated.
Bandwidth can be used as a holistic performance evaluation
tool of these fairness schemes. Another project of this type
of fairness is a real-trace-driven approach called FOG [68].
This approach basically studies and analyzes the tradeoff be-
tween the efficiency and fairness of rank-based forwarding
techniques in OppNets. Using local information, it ensures
efficiency–fairness tradeoff and guarantees relative equality in
the distribution of resource usage among neighboring nodes. In
addition, it keeps the success rate and cost performance near
optimal.
2) Social Fairness: As users’ interests and identification
information are considered valuable resources in MSNs, the
direct revelation of identity information to unknown users may
result in an unfair situation when other sides of the identifica-
tion process misbehave. This is the second class of fairness,
which we call social fairness. This type of fairness focuses on
the fair allocation of resources, specifically identity information
revelation. As an essential factor of the wide acceptance of
applications in distributed systems, fairness has thoroughly
been researched. However, in emerging MSNs, establishing this
type of fairness brings about a new set of challenges [69], in-
cluding the following: distinguishing between an unfair cheat-
ing behavior and an unpredictable disconnection, information
traceability and identifiability over the untrustworthy and short-
term neighbors, and time sensitivity of location-based services.
In order to ensure perfect fairness, a trusted third party (TTP)
had to be involved. Hence, an approach called gradual exchange
protocol (GEP) [70] was presented to achieve fairness without
TTP involvement by discouraging cheating behaviors. This
protocol allows two users to reveal part of a secret to each
other in iterations until they both have access to each other’s
entire secrets. Using the basics of GEP, years later, a non-TTP
protocol for MSNs called fine-grained identification [71] was
designed. This protocol provides confidentiality, weak linkage,
and real-time fairness. For this protocol, identification is carried
out by an iterative identification information exchange process
where participants must disclose part of their identification
information to each other. The process terminates whenever one
of them fails to do so. In this way, if a user loses part of his/her
identification information to another user, they must have
obtained an approximately equal amount of identification
information.
C. Private Matching
Matchmaking is the key component of MSNs. It notifies
users of possible candidates for partnership, based on some
criteria such as shared interests. Personal profile disclosure,
which is shown in Fig. 12, is an example of matchmaking
that flusters users in proximity. The matchmaking process must
happen before making decision for any interaction because
attackers are in direct correlation with the personal profiles.
This situation highlights the necessity for private matching to
let two users conceal their personal profiles while in connection.
Based on their mechanisms, private matching schemes can be
identified in three subgroups, including secret sharing, coarse-
grained schemes, and fine-grained schemes. These subgroups
are described in the next three sections.
1) Secret Sharing: The first set of secret sharing approaches
adopted homomorphic encryption. Apparently, the first attempt
to implement such encryption dates back to FNP [72]. Using
this scheme, a client and a server compute the intersection of
their sets while the client gets the result and the server learns
nothing. In other words, FNP takes advantage of homomorphic
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Fig. 12. Example of profile matchmaking where factors like age, university
major, and interests have been considered as profile information.
encryption to represent the client’s input obliviously. Later, in
[73], a complimentary scheme was proposed. This scheme not
only enables set intersection, union cardinality, and overthresh-
old operations but also extends FNP to multiple players. This
approach was later improved by Sang et al. [74] in which they
considerably reduced computation and communication costs.
The problem with all these works is that, due to the strong de-
pendence on homomorphic encryption and disability to imple-
ment linear computational complexity, almost none of them are
practical enough to be applied to MSNs. To make such schemes
compatible, some other lines of work pursue information theo-
retical security and try to follow secret sharing techniques. An
important work in this area was proposed in [75]. This work
uses a secret sharing scheme to provide a distributed solution
of the FNP. In this scheme, the authors use a polynomial to
represent one party’s data set as in FNP and then distribute the
polynomial to multiple servers. They extend their solution to the
distributed set intersection and the cardinality of the intersec-
tion. Another example of secret sharing-based private matching
was presented in [76]. This work suggests an unconditional
secure multiparty set intersection scheme in which the inputs
are shared among all parties using threshold secret sharing.
Computations are done on those shares to obtain the shares of
the outputs. Later in [77], the authors utilize secret sharing to
compute the dot product securely through trusted third parties.
2) Coarse-Grained Schemes: The basic aim of coarse-
grained private matching schemes is to match two users accord-
ing to the privacy-preserving computation of the intersection
(cardinality) of their attribute sets. Almost all these schemes
implicitly assume that each user’s personal profile consists of
multiple public sets of characteristics derived from a public set
of attributes. FindU [78] was the first coarse-grained privacy-
preserving personal profile matching scheme for MSNs. It
fulfills the primary privacy demand for a personal profile. An
initiating user can find best matches according to their desired
attributes while the actual set of matching attributes between the
initiating user and any other user is hidden from all participants.
FindU also contains different levels of user privacy. While
leveraging secure multiparty computation techniques, it defines
protocols to realize increasing levels of user privacy protection.
Fig. 13. Example of a friend-of-friend detection scheme in MSNs showing a
matchmaking scenario where an intermediate node, which is in interconnection
with different nodes and shares their profile information, tries to maintain
friendship between them.
Some coarse-grained approaches focus on friendship discov-
ery, using friend-of-friend detection algorithms. These algo-
rithms mainly define an intermediate node called matchmaker
that is responsible to establish interconnections between nodes,
which have similar interests and with which it is in contact (see
Fig. 13).
An example of mobile social networking platforms that
implement the friend-of-friend detection algorithm is a privacy-
preserving personal profile matching scheme called VENETA
[79]. Rather than only exploiting information about the users of
the system, the method relies on real friends and adequately
addresses the arising privacy issues. It makes use of some
notations, including commutative and homomorphic encryp-
tion, and passive and active adversaries to exhibit features
like contact matching, decentralized messaging, server bound
messaging, and user location tracking.
Later, Wei et al. [80] presented a piece of work, which
focuses on developing some techniques and protocols to com-
pute social proximity between two users in order to discover
potential friends. It, however, identifies potential attacks against
friend discovery to develop a solution for secure proximity esti-
mation with privacy and variability considerations. In this way,
their proposed approach does not match two users using the
cardinality of their attribute sets. Instead, they proposed using
the social proximity between two users as the matching metric,
which measures the distance between their social coordinates
with each being a vector precomputed by a trusted central server
to represent the location of a user in an MSN.
To expand matchmaking protocols for MSNs, a privacy-
preserving matchmaking protocol [81] has been proposed. It
lets a potentially malicious user learn only the shared common
interests with a nearby user. This protocol is distributed and
does not require a trusted server to track users or be involved
in any matchmaking operation. The mentioned mechanism
offers the capability to defy against passive and active at-
tacks like the user’s interest exploration, impersonation, and
eavesdropping.
3) Fine-Grained Schemes: Generally, the schemes based on
coarse-grained private matching are unable to further differen-
tiate users with the same attributes. To deal with this problem,
fine-grained private matching protocols were proposed [82],
which enable two users to perform profile matching without any
need for information disclosures. In contrast to coarse-grained
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private matching schemes, these protocols allow finer differ-
entiation between users and support a wide range of matching
metrics at different privacy levels. The first protocol is for the
first level distance, which is the sum of the absolute difference
in each attribute. The second protocol is a threshold-based
protocol. It is based on this distance too, in which two users can
determine whether the distance between their profiles is smaller
than some personally chosen threshold. The third protocol
is based on the maximum distance, which is the maximum
difference among attributes.
D. Location Privacy
Social networks offer different types of location-based ser-
vices such as photo sharing, friend tracking, and check-ins.
However, to be able to deliver such services, users’ locations
have to be revealed, which causes privacy threats. Location
privacy gives individuals or group users the ability to seclude
or reveal their location selectively. The following four sections
discuss different types of schemes designed to maintain this
kind of privacy, including obfuscation-based schemes, social-
based schemes, dynamic pseudonymity, and key anonymity.
1) Obfuscation-Based Schemes: Obfuscation was probably
the first scheme to be employed to achieve location privacy.
One of the first attempts in this area was proposed by Duckham
and Kulik [83]. They use obfuscation in a formal framework
to protect location privacy within a pervasive computing envi-
ronment. The proposed framework provides a computationally
efficient mechanism for balancing a user’s need for high-quality
information services against the user’s need for location pri-
vacy. Negotiation is used to ensure that a location-based service
provider receives only the information that it needs to know in
order to provide a service of satisfactory quality.
The authors in [84] propose a different obfuscation technique
to protect the location privacy of users. They present various
obfuscation operators by changing their location information.
In addition, they introduce an adversary model and provide an
analysis of the proposed obfuscation operators to evaluate their
robustness against adversaries.
Another example of obfuscation-based location privacy ap-
proaches is social-based location privacy protocol [85]. It offers
location privacy through a request/reply location obfuscation
technique. This protocol uses the nodes’ own social network to
drive the forwarding heuristic and utilizes social ties between
nodes to ensure k-anonymity. This can result in a noticeable
improvement in location privacy for users accessing location-
based services.
2) Social-Based Schemes: Location privacy is considered a
big concern in social networks. This is laid on some of the key
features of these types of networks such as information sharing
and content distributions. A fundamental research in this area
has been done in [86] where privacy aspects in geosocial
networks (GeoSNs) are studied. These types of social networks
provide context-aware services that help associate location with
users and content. In this paper, privacy aspects were classified
in four categories (including location, absence, colocation, and
identity privacy), and possible means of protecting privacy in
these circumstances were described.
Another work was proposed by Li et al. [87], which ad-
dresses the location privacy issue for the nearby friend alert
service, a common and fundamental service in mobile GeoSNs.
In this paper, the grid-and-hashing paradigm was adopted, and
an optimal grid overlay and multilevel grids were developed
to increase the detection accuracy while saving the wireless
bandwidth. Based on these techniques, the client-side location
update scheme and the server-side update handling procedure
for continuous proximity detection were devised.
In [88], the authors demonstrate a new type of user privacy
attack and propose a solution for it. They used a fake location
reporting technique to prevent an enemy from combining the lo-
cation and friendship information found in MSNs. This solution
does not require any additional trusted third party deployment
and can enhance location privacy.
A common problem with most of location privacy-preserving
approaches in MSNs is that the data-forwarding process can be
interrupted or even disabled when the privacy preservations of
users are applied. This is because users become unrecognizable
to each other and the social ties and interactions are no longer
traceable to facilitate cooperative data forwarding. Another
problem with these approaches is that, to apply user coopera-
tion, an intrusion must be exerted on user privacy. In order to
solve such problems, social morality [89] was proposed. It is
a protocol suite which achieves both privacy preservation and
cooperative data forwarding in three steps. The first step is to
notify a user’s anonymized mobility information to the public
using a privacy-preserving route-based authentication scheme.
The second step measures the proximity of the user’s mobility
information to a specific packet’s destination and evaluates
the user’s forwarding capacity for the packet. The third step
determines the optimal data-forwarding strategy according to
morality level and payoff, using a game-theoretical approach.
3) Dynamic Pseudonymity: Anonymity can be provided via
the frequent changing of pseudonyms, in order to make it dif-
ficult for adversaries to detect a user’s movement, information,
location, etc. This technique has been widely adopted to provide
location privacy. One of the finest approaches in this area was
proposed by Magkos et al. [90]. In this paper, a distributed
scheme which deals with both security and historical privacy in
MSNs is suggested. In other words, it establishes access control
while protecting the privacy of a user in both sporadic and
continuous queries. To maintain security, this scheme employs
a hybrid network architecture which gives users an ability to
communicate with a location-based service provider through
a network operator. Using this architecture, users are enabled
to create wireless ad hoc networks with other users in order
to obtain privacy against an adversary that performs traffic
analysis. To maintain historical privacy, this scheme adopts
the generic approach of using multiple pseudonyms that are
changed frequently. Messages are not sent directly to the cel-
lular operator but are distributed among mobile neighbors, so
they can re-encrypt the messages before sending them to the
location-based service provider via the cellular operator. This
makes messages untraceable against traffic analysis attacks.
Another important work regarding dynamic pseudonymity
is a privacy-preserving location proof updating system for
location-based services called APPLAUS [91]. It utilizes
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colocated Bluetooth which enables mobile devices to mutually
generate location proofs and update to a location proof server.
This work contains a user-centric location privacy model to
evaluate user location privacy levels in real time and gives users
the ability to accept a location proof exchange request based
on their location privacy levels. In this method, mobile devices
use periodically changed pseudonyms to protect source location
privacy.
However, APPLAUS could not resist collusion attacks and
could only detect them. Regarding the fact that this method
uses pseudonyms to keep contact patterns of nodes, if the
pseudonyms are changed in an improper time or location, the
solution offered in APPLAUS may become invalid. This can
simply be the source of collusion attacks. To cope with this
issue, Rongxing et al. presented an effective pseudonym chang-
ing at social spots (PCS) [92] for vehicular ad hoc networks.
They introduce social spots as the place where several vehicles
may gather and try to make vehicles change their pseudonyms
at some highly social spots. Then, using PCS strategy, vehicles
are able to intelligently change their pseudonyms at the right
moment and place. Later, the authors of APPLAUS expanded
their method [93] by incorporating two new approaches for out-
lier detection, including betweenness ranking-based approach
and correlation clustering-based approach. These new features
make APPLAUS extremely resilient against collusion attacks.
4) Key Anonymity: An important challenge in the wide de-
ployment of location-based services is to provide safeguards for
the location privacy of mobile clients against vulnerabilities for
abuse. In order to achieve such a goal, key anonymity schemes
have been widely deployed. For example, the authors in [94] de-
velop a personalized location anonymization model and a suite
of location perturbation algorithms to protect location privacy
in the deployment of location-based services. This architecture
takes advantage of a flexible privacy personalization framework
to support location k-anonymity for a wide range of users with
context-sensitive privacy requirements. The proposed frame-
work enables each node to specify the minimum level of
anonymity that it desires and the maximum temporal and
spatial tolerances that it is willing to accept when requesting
k-anonymity-preserving location-based services. The model is
able to be run by the anonymity server on a trusted platform
and can perform location anonymization on identity removal
and spatiotemporal cloaking of the location information.
Traditional approaches to K-anonymity guarantee privacy
over publicly released data sets with specified quasi-identifiers.
However, due to the fact that common public releases of
personal data are done through social networks and their ap-
plication program interface (API), these approaches are barely
responsible for today’s needs. In other words, k-anonymity
in social networks does not allow clear assumptions about
quasi-identifiers, which makes traditional approaches impos-
sible to be responsible for their privacy needs. In order to
address this problem, Social-K [95] suggests a new definition of
k-anonymity. In this definition, social networks guarantee pri-
vacy in real time to users of their API. In order to achieve
privacy while improving the key update efficiency of location-
based services in vehicular ad hoc networks, a dynamic privacy-
preserving key management scheme called DIKE [96] was
proposed. It uses a particular type of privacy-preserving au-
thentication technique that not only provides the vehicle user’s
anonymous authentication but also enables double-registration
detection as well. DIKE updates keys by dividing the session of
a location-based service into several time slots so that each time
slot holds a different session key. When no vehicle user departs
from the service session, each joined user can use a one-way
hash function to autonomously update the new session key for
achieving forward secrecy. In addition, this scheme integrates
a dynamic threshold technique to achieve the session key’s
backward secrecy.
E. Communication Privacy
Preserving an individual’s privacy when communicating is
another issue in every type of network. In order to give proper
solutions, different privacy-enhancing technologies have been
developed. That includes technologies like cryptography, au-
thentication, and digital signatures. These technologies have
various algorithms and protocols, which are used to a large
extent in computer networks.
One example of the approaches in this area is PEACE [97].
It is a privacy-enhanced security framework consisting of au-
thentication and key agreement protocols for wireless mesh
networks (WMNs). These types of networks contain nodes with
the ability to both disseminate their own data and propagate the
data in the network. PEACE enforces strict user access control
to cope with both free riders and malicious users. In addition,
it offers user privacy protection against both adversaries and
various other network entities.
Another example is the work proposed in [98]. This work
presents a hybrid communication protocol to ensure mobile
users’ anonymity against various adversaries. It exploits the
capability of handheld devices to connect to both Wi-Fi and
cellular networks. The authors consider all parties that can
intercept communications between a mobile user and a server
as potential privacy threats. In addition, they describe how
a micropayment scheme that suits their mobile scenario can
provide incentives for peers to collaborate in the protocol.
To conclude, some of recent schemes in MSN privacy are
discussed and highlighted in Table III.
VI. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
MSNs face various safety issues and challenges from dif-
ferent disciplines such as trust, security, and privacy. Despite
extensive research on MSNs, focusing on the aforementioned
aspects, there are still some questions left unanswered. In the
remainder of this section, we go one step further by presenting
some future research directions of safety challenges, which
brings new vision into the horizon of safety in MSN research.
A. Trust
One of the capital assets in MSN safety is trust establishment
and maintenance which has gained immense considerations,
particularly in recent years. Widespread approaches such as that
in [13] exist which aim to present ways to have smooth levels
of trust between relations as in real-world social networks.
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TABLE III
DEMONSTRATION OF SOME RECENT SAFETY SCHEMES IN PRIVACY CATEGORY IN MSNs
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However, transitivity in certification chains and community
detection define no barriers among social categories. This may
not reflect reality accurately. Depending on the environment,
the explicit and the implicit social trust should be weighed
dynamically. In addition, an aging mechanism has to be applied
to remove old or random encountered users and not end up
with a clique resulting in a meaningless even structure. As
an alternative, RSs can provide higher levels of trust such as
taste similarity by comparing ratings, but they also have to
be secured. Further research must investigate the interrelation
between social trust and RSs.
Some other considerable future challenges regarding trust lie
behind opportunistic sensing [25] which tends to integrate com-
munication more closely with human behavior. This integration
could lead to innovative applications that can sense the context
of the user with a higher accuracy, thus providing a more per-
sonalized solution. For the next generation of sensing systems,
an architecture based on the control and management of trust-
worthy social computing like socially aware network services
is needed. Meanwhile, as trustworthiness for an application is
enhanced, a simultaneous need for ensuring social informatics’
consumption and processing will be required. To do this, the
following questions must be answered: How do we determine
the appropriate boundary for social informatics, and how do
we quantitatively measure the value of social informatics? How
do we balance the concern of privacy and anonymity by intro-
ducing a socially aware system? How can we make sure that
we do not create any new or unexpected vulnerability? Which
process must be taken into consideration in order to form a con-
verging and collaborative decision about high-level security?
To design most of the protocols associated with safety,
public-key management plays an important role. For a safe
incentive scheme, any misbehaving or malicious nodes will pay
the penalty of having their public-key certificates revoked. Even
for those selfish nodes that run out of their credits, one possible
punishment action is also revoking their certificates or reducing
their class-of-service right by revising their certificates. How-
ever, a public-key revocation scheme [45] still represents a
great challenge in MSNs because the nodes may suffer from
delayed or frequent loss of connectivity to certificate revoca-
tion list servers and may lead to a lot of extra management
costs. Schemes like SMART [33], which use traditional public-
key-certificate-based cryptography as the basic cryptographic
tool, are potential cases for further improvement. This can
be done by adopting identity-based cryptography to recognize
the efficient bundle authentication. This is a relatively new
cryptographic method and is also a powerful alternative to
traditional certificate-based cryptography.
Meanwhile, opportunistic communication and information
dissemination in social networks are surprisingly robust toward
the form of altruism distribution [35], largely due to their
multiple forwarding paths. So far, altruism distribution has been
considered static and steady. It would be interesting to study the
altruism values resulting from gaming strategies to get feed-
back from prior delivery history. In many cases, users are not
supposed to memorize their own previous rejection history for
message delivery of other nodes while variations, like limiting
the number of delivery requests for a single user to avoid
excessive requests, could be studied. In addition, the power
consumption of nodes and altruism effect on it would be another
interesting issue to research. For example, one could measure
how much power a node might save by choosing to be selfish
compared with being only altruistic within its community.
The idea of leveraging social networking information enables
node cooperation in mobile OppNets. In most papers on this
topic like [38], data sets do not represent performance of the
trust filters in large-scale networks. In other words, they do not
indicate whether these trust filters can be efficiently estimated
and implemented using a distributed algorithm running with
local information at the nodes. However, a detailed mechanism
for sharing and transmitting this social information upon which
trust is based is crucial.
B. Security
Security is a classic angle of network safety that has been
massively discussed in the MSN literature. Albeit widespread
research on this area, proposed schemes still need refinements
or adjustment. Anonymous social-location-based architectures
such as that in [53], which do not imply a specific imple-
mentation of any particular component, are examples of these
schemes. They should be managed through a centralized in-
frastructure on the Internet or integrated into a P2P trust net-
work. However, the way in which preferences are chosen and
returned to the stationary component could be optimized for
different metrics. This mechanism could be designed to provide
k-anonymity for a set of users’ encrypted identifier rather than
just one at a time. This relates to a more general set theory
problem. A set of social network information associated with a
set of users should be chosen in a way that the set of preferences
cannot map back to any one or any set of the users within some
guarantee.
Another concept around security is cloud [52] which em-
ploys provision for vagueness and counterintelligence resistant
investigation functionality. Although the influence on recovery
potential has been ensured and a rich data replica and query
language have been born, the secrecy and counterintelligence
resistance procedures conceptualized are natural and can be
used to novelize any unstructured overlay. Future research
includes expanding the scrutiny to other modernized assault
environments. This can be done for a Sybil attack where a
spiteful host manages to fake multiple identities and assaults.
It can also be applied for an Eclipse attack where a host is
detached from other hosts and then assaulted. In addition, it
is probable to employ certain characteristics of the prevalent
network in order to safeguard itself against Sybil or similar
assaults. To deal with the attacks like location cheating [55], the
countermeasures against location cheating should be revised.
Although several techniques for the security enhancement of lo-
cation information have been suggested, finding better solutions
to identify possible cheaters and maintain balance between the
usability and the security still remain challenging.
The concept of IDSs has been vastly studied, and experi-
mental results demonstrate a high rate of adaptation to MSN
security. For instance, an anomaly detection approach like that
in [57] can work well on different wireless ad hoc networks,
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including MSNs, but the question is how to detect an intru-
sion that relies on a single maneuver? For example, anomaly
detection can be very effective against multiconnection-based
port scan, DoS, and buffer-overflow attacks. This shows that
there are some natural limits on detection capabilities, depend-
ing on which layer the data are collected. However, a few
system parameters exist that may change the normal behavior
tremendously. One of them is the mobility level; if the model is
classified using values from another mobility level, the alarm
rate can be much higher. Although this can be solved by
randomizing the mobility level in the experiment, the current
ns-2 code does not yet support this feature. To this end, schemes
must be developed to cluster and classify the normal scenarios
and build specific anomaly detection models for each type of
normal scenarios.
C. Privacy
One of the most controversial issues around privacy which
has attracted attentions due to its novelty is fairness. Finding the
most optimal tradeoff between fairness and efficiency is vital
in MSNs, but unfortunately, not much has been done in this
area. To quantify the satisfaction of the users from the way that
their services are allocated, linear schemes like utility function
scheme [67] exist. However, any linear combination of utilities
is unable to ensure the ambiguity of social welfare values even
if multiple types of service flow are used. Moreover, applying
standard methods of experimental economics, such as the mean
opinion score, can result in much more vigorous schemes to
preserve fairness and maintain its balance with efficiency.
To preserve privacy in MSN applications, matchmaking pro-
tocols such as those in [82] have been broadly studied, but some
questions, like how real people use matchmaking protocols
to learn more about the usefulness of MSN application, still
remain unanswered.
VII. CONCLUSION
The concept of MSNs is a novel social communica-
tion paradigm that exploits opportunistic encounters between
human-carried devices and social networks. Like any other
emergent archetype of technology, MSNs demand time to be
totally safe and immune. Having social aspects included, they
encompass more complex and correlated challenging safety
problems that make it difficult to suggest solutions and repre-
sent a clear classification on safety issues. This paper has aimed
to provide an overall view of safety challenges in this young
and exciting field, particularly from the perspective of trust,
security, and privacy. To provide a comprehensive and precise
investigation, each category was divided into different smaller
subcategories. The trust-related issues were discussed in four
categories, namely, malignity prevention, assorted trustworthi-
ness, selfishness discouragement, and cooperation enforcement.
The security-based challenges were deeply investigated in three
groups, namely, access control, confidentiality, and intrusion
detection. The privacy-engaged provinces were indicated and
argued in three classes, namely, obfuscation, fairness encour-
agement, and private matching. Consequently, the major issues
related to safety issues, lately discussed in the literature, were
described. Finally, several major open research issues were
discussed, and future research directions were outlined.
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